by Howard T. Anderson
Earlier posts in this space have discussed how corruption can harm societies beyond the obvious waste and inefficiency that occurs when scarce resources are diverted into the pockets of corrupt actors; and how corruption works differently in democracies and autocracies. Recent media accounts of corruption-related developments in Ukraine, China, and India illustrate some of these differences. This discussion will focus on Ukraine, an aspiring democracy with a legacy of corruption and oligarchy closely tied to its historic domination by Russia. It will highlight Ukraine’s efforts to convince Western allies that its anticorruption efforts are genuine while at the same time fighting a war for its survival.
A recent article by David L. Stern and Michael Birnbaum discusses the conundrum Ukraine faces because of its longstanding reputation for corruption: “Ukraine claims to be winning its war on corruption. The West says: Do more.” Washington Post, June 20, 2024. While recognizing Ukraine’s anticorruption efforts, the authors report, U.S. and Western European officials are telling their Ukrainian counterparts that they must do more because the ongoing perception of corruption imperils the economic and military assistance Ukraine needs to survive Russia’s war against it. To underscore this point, the article notes that a group of congressional Republicans obstructed U.S. aid to Ukraine in part because of claimed concerns about corruption. The delay they caused allowed Russian forces to advance. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken summarized Ukraine’s challenge: “Winning on the battlefield will prevent Ukraine from becoming part of Russia. Winning the war against corruption will keep Ukraine from becoming like Russia.”
A later report concerning the July 2024 NATO meeting in Washington (Missy Ryan, Michael Birnbaum, Emily Rauhala, and Ellen Nakashima, “NATO vows lasting support for Ukraine but won’t promise membership,” Washington Post, July 9, 2024) confirmed Western pressure on Ukraine to do more to fight corruption.
Ukrainian officials insist that they are fighting corruption and doing so effectively. The foreign minister, as quoted in the Stern-Birnbaum article, contrasted “perception of the level of corruption” with the “facts about the level of corruption.” High-profile arrests and dismissals that contribute to the perception of corruption, Ukrainians argue, should instead be viewed as just the opposite. As a Ukrainian prosecutor put it, if the number of corruption cases doubles, it does not mean there is twice as much corruption. “On the contrary: It means that we’re twice as effective as before.”
The prosecutor’s comment touches upon a problem that has bedeviled anticorruption initiatives around the world: how to implement prevention, detection, and enforcement mechanisms that are both effective and perceived to be so, especially when prosecuting corruption cases can increase, rather than diminish, a preexisting reputation for corruption.
One aspect of the problem is the disconnect between the metrics for measuring perception on the one hand and commitment to fighting corruption on the other. Transparency International’s (TI’s) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provides a long-established metric that ranks 180 countries according to how outsiders perceive their levels of corruption. These days, however, even the most corrupt countries are likely to have made public statements proclaiming their commitment to fighting corruption and there is no comparable metric for ranking countries’ anticorruption efforts. How, then, can we distinguish genuine and effective commitments to fight corruption from those that are fraudulent or, at best, half-hearted window dressing?
While there is no easy formula, the following are key issues for evaluating the credibility of any jurisdiction’s claim to be committed to fighting corruption.
1. Political Support
No anticorruption program is sustainable without political support, which in a democracy means that both the citizenry and relevant government agencies must be on board. In Ukraine’s case, popular support for vigorous anticorruption efforts has been evident since at least the 2014 “Mardan Revolution,” during which hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took part in public demonstrations against rampant corruption under the Russian-influenced presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. The current president, Volodymyr Zelensky, ran for office pledging to fight corruption; as noted, his administration has taken steps in that direction although the U.S. and other allies are urging him to do more.
The absence of large-scale demonstrations such as occurred in Ukraine does not necessarily mean that citizens do not support anticorruption initiatives. There can be many reasons why citizens appear to accept corruption: fear of reprisal from powerful interests benefitting from the corruption; widespread belief among the populace that they are powerless to do anything about it; propaganda and disinformation, to name a few. In such cases, it is important to avoid buying into a common rationalization for tolerating corruption: it is just part of the “culture” of certain benighted countries, regions, and ethnic groups. Few people anywhere—and certainly not those at the economic margins—enjoying forking over a percentage of their meager wealth to gangsters or corrupt government officials; if they do so, it is because they believe they have no choice.
2. Rule of Law
Without strong legal standards, traditions, and the independent institutions needed to apply them to corruption cases, anticorruption enforcement can degenerate into a convenient way to punish political enemies. Thus, a key test is the extent to which a country holds friends and allies of ruling elites accountable. The rule of law includes an appropriate degree of independence for judicial and law enforcement agencies; adequate laws and regulations defining corrupt practices; and workable rules of evidence and procedure.
3. Responsible Media
The media play an important role in exposing corruption and supporting reasonable efforts to combat it. To do this, there must be a degree of independence and responsibility; the media cannot be either subservient to autocratic or corrupt governments or irresponsible purveyors of misinformation. Independent journalists have uncovered many corruption schemes. As important as exposing corruption is, however, it is equally important to disprove false allegations and to avoid giving unwarranted publicity to disinformation. One of the most sensational corruption allegations against Ukrainian officials reported in the Stern-Birnbaum article—that Zelensky had used foreign money to buy two yachts–proved to be false and was traced to Russian disinformation sources.
4. Competence
Those responsible for preventing corruption, detecting violations, and enforcing relevant legal standards must have adequate resources, training, and commitment if they are to be effective. Building and institutionalizing such competence depends in large part on the level of political support anticorruption initiatives and agencies have in each country. With such support, equipping and training those engaged in anticorruption activities is a doable project. (IACRC, as described elsewhere in this website, can help in this area.) Training and equipment will be insufficient, however, if those in both leadership and support roles in the fight against corruption do not share a sense of mission guided by an appropriate moral compass.
5. Historical Trends
Any fair evaluation of a nation’s—or other jurisdiction’s—anticorruption efforts must take into consideration the obstacles faced because of historical or other circumstances. Ukraine, for example, is trying to overcome a long history of Russian domination even as it is fighting to prevent Russia from regaining its former control of the country. Implementing a strong anticorruption program in these circumstances would challenge any nation. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether the nation is moving in the right direction notwithstanding a lingering perception that it is corrupt.
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In summary, democracies and aspiring democracies can fight corruption effectively in a variety of ways suitable to their individual situations provided certain basic conditions are present or in development. The next post in this series will examine recent reports from the much different world of anticorruption initiatives by autocratic governments.