by Howard T. Anderson
When Russian dictator Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, most observers expected the Ukrainians to fold quickly under the onslaught of a much larger country thought to have one of the world’s most powerful militaries. They did not. Early in the conflict, Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian drive toward its capital, Kiev, killing or wounding thousands of Russians; later in 2022, they reclaimed large chunks of territory in the eastern part of the country which the Russians had overrun in the war’s first phase.
These astonishing events were accompanied by media images of stalled, abandoned, and destroyed Russian tanks, trucks, and other equipment along with consistent reports of dysfunction and incompetence in its military leadership, morale problems among the troops, and frequent equipment, coordination, and communications breakdowns. Glaring conflicts between the propagandistic claims being made by Putin’s agents and what the outside world could see was happening on the ground in Ukraine aggravated the diplomatic and public relations setbacks Russia was experiencing because of its invasion. With the credibility of the conventional military degraded, desperate pro-Putin extremists began dropping dark hints that Russia might turn to nuclear weapons.
Why did Russia’s military perform so poorly in an invasion expected to be a cakewalk?
There were surely multiple causes, not least the determination and resourcefulness of Ukraine’s defenders, but Russia’s massive, longstanding corruption almost certainly contributed. Early in the war Bill Browder, once a leading foreign investor in Russia who became a prominent critic of Putin’s regime, highlighted corruption’s role in checking Russia’s advance. He estimated that 80 percent of the military budget was stolen “because 80% of all budgets in Russia are stolen by the officials in charge.” [“A Veteran Putin Foe Sizes up Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, Mar.26-27, 2022, A13] More recently, a study by the Foreign Policy Research Institute found “endemic corruption” among the factors contributing to Russia’s subpar performance in Ukraine along with excessive centralization, failure to communicate accurate information, and historic factors including “an imperialist national identity. . .and societal brutality.” [fpri.org/article/2023/03/the-roots-of-russian-military-dysfunction]
The toxic combination of endemic corruption, a political system based on fear and brutality, and a propaganda machine that keeps the Russian public saturated with lies and false narratives can be a short-term strength for autocrats like Putin. It enables them to loot their country’s resources and pursue ill-advised military adventures without running the risks democratic leaders would under similar circumstances. Independent journalists, to the extent they are allowed to operate at all, can be severely punished or even killed if they expose the wrong kind of corruption—meaning that of the autocrats or their friends and allies. Political opponents can be killed or jailed and a false narrative about them concocted by the government’s propaganda machine.
Even less do autocrats fear investigation by officials bound to the rule of law, nor trial on corruption charges by an independent judiciary. Autocracies typically use anticorruption laws selectively to punish political enemies or anyone rash enough to expose their corruption. An instructive example is Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who in 2011 started an anticorruption foundation in Russia that exposed corruption among Putin’s supporters. In 2021 Navalny’s foundation released a documentary, “Putin’s Palace,” which targeted Putin’s own extravagant wealth. That same year, the Russian government dissolved Navalny’s anticorruption foundation; in 2022 it was re-launched outside Russia as the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), an international organization. [ ACF.international.com]
Navalny was repeatedly harassed by Russian authorities, culminating in a botched assassination attempt that Navalny proved was carried out by Putin’s security agents. The documentary film “Navalny”—which won an Academy Award in 2023—recounts the process by which the attempted murder was linked to Russian agents as well as Navalny’s dramatic voluntary return to Russia, where he is serving a long prison sentence on charges that amount to opposing Putin and his invasion of Ukraine.
What corrupt autocratic governments cannot control through silencing critics are the real-world consequences of sending poorly trained, led, and equipped troops into battle. This happens when government officials and their cronies loot military budgets and disguise their corruption through fraud—such as pretending to furnish the troops with state-of-the-art weaponry while supplying them instead with substandard equipment that breaks down under the pressure of combat. Low morale is also a predictable consequence of endemic corruption. It is hard to instill loyalty among troops sent to war by a government widely perceived to be grounded in self-dealing by those in power. Few persons sent into battle will have benefitted from the corruption, but many will absorb the cynicism underlying it, no doubt accounting for much of the cruder looting that occurs by troops in the field. Small wonder that Russia must empty prisons to fill its ranks in Ukraine.
Because it greatly exceeds Ukraine in population and resources and is insulated from democratic pressures, Russia can keep its war going for a time even as the effects of corruption kill its soldiers in large numbers. Ukraine does not have that luxury. Corruption threatens Ukraine’s war effort—indeed, its survival as a nation–in ways that illustrate how differently it can affect democratic and autocratic societies.
As a fledgling democracy dependent on support from the United States and other democracies to keep its military in the field against the Russians, Ukraine must demonstrate a commitment to democratic and anticorruption principles. Demonstrating a sharp contrast with Putin’s regime is vital to Ukraine’s survival; it allows the Ukrainian struggle against Russian invaders to be viewed as protecting the interests of all democracies against the forces of barbarism and autocracy. The more Ukraine aspires to be accepted as a genuine democracy, however, the more pressure it comes under to show that it adheres to the rule of law—including holding corrupt actors to account even when they are political allies. [See, for example, the Washington Post’s lead editorial for June 15, 2023, entitled “First item in rebuilding Ukraine? Fighting Corruption.” See also, “With aid at stake, Ukraine clamps down on graft: Persistent corruption could threaten funding from wartime allies,” Washington Post, June 20, 2023, A1.]
What Ukraine has done to overcome its history of corruption is a topic for another day, as is corruption’s role in American congressional battles over aid to Ukraine. The next case study, however, will concern another prominent war: the conflict between Israel and Hamas that started in October 2023.